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Abstract
This paper studies the eﬀect of production volatility on the dura-
tion of temporary contracts. A simple theoretical model is developed,
in order to depict the choice of contract duration made by a ﬁrm re-
cruiting temps to deal with activity peaks. Assuming that the hiring
of a new temp is associated with selection and training costs, longer
contracts have an option value in view of greater uncertainty. The
model has two testable implications. First, production volatility posi-
tively aﬀects contract length. Second, the shortage of alternative em-
ployment opportunities negatively aﬀects contract length. Using data
on Italian temporary workers, both implications are conﬁrmed by the
econometric analysis. Since contract duration turns out to be a good
proxy of the precariousness of temps, it is precisely in more volatile
sectors that temporary workers -in a sense- are not so “temporary”.
∗I would like to thank “Manpower Italia” for allowing me to use its personnel data
set. Many thanks also to Andrea Ichino, Samuel Bentolila, participants at the XVII AIEL
Conference in Labor Economics, and lunch seminar participants at EUI and MIT for their
insightful comments and suggestions. Contact information: EUI, Department of Eco-
nomics, Via della Piazzuola 43, 50133 Firenze, ITALY. Email: tommaso.nannicini@iue.it.
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During the 1990s, temporary help employment (THE henceforth)1 widely
expanded in developed countries. It rapidly grew where it was already used
and was liberalized where it was previously forbidden. Even though it main-
tains a small absolute incidence over the stock of total employees at any
point in time, this non-standard contract is now a common experience of
a large number of individuals, because of the high turnover of workers em-
ployed in similar positions. Many issues concerning THE have been analyzed
in theoretical and empirical works: the reasons why it is used; the factors
explaining its recent growth in diﬀerent environments; the characteristics of
workers who select themselves into this relationship; the transition from tem-
porary to permanent employment.2 One issue that has remained unexplored
concerns the determinants of contract length in this employment relationship.
Segal and Sullivan (1997a) use US administrative data to study the duration
of job spells in the THE industry, but they do not investigate what aﬀects the
length of the assignments. This paper focuses on the determinants of desired
contract durations, and particularly on the relationship between production
volatility and contract length. Focusing on this issue is interesting per se,
since it oﬀers an empirical test which discriminates between the diverging
ﬁndings of the theoretical literature on contract length (brieﬂyr e v i e w e di n
Section 2). Moreover, this analysis sheds light on the welfare eﬀects of THE,
since contract duration turns out to be a good proxy of “how temporary”
temporary workers actually are (as discussed below).
The Italian labor market is the reference case, but the results might have a
general scope. In Italy, THE was recently liberalized (see law 196/1997)3 and
1This expression refers to a triangular contract, in which an agency hires a worker for
the purpose of placing her/him at the disposal of an using ﬁrm for a short-term assignment.
2See -among others- Segal and Sullivan (1997a, 1997b), Abraham (1988), Estevao and
Lach (1999), Houseman (2000) and Autor (2000a, 2000b) about the US; Russo et al.
(1997), Lechner et al. (2001), Malo and Munoz-Bullon (2002), Montanino and Sestito
(2003) and Ichino et al. (2004) about European countries. See Oecd (2002) for a survey.
3The Italian law forbids ﬁrms to use temporary contracts in the following cases: re-
placement of workers on strike; ﬁrms that made collective dismissals in the last 12m o n t h s ;
jobs that require medical vigilance; ﬁrms that are experiencing a time-of-work reduction.
Collective agreements stipulate that temporary workers cannot exceed 8-15% of total em-
ployees (depending on the sector), and ﬁx the allowed motivations for using them (peak
activity; one-oﬀ work; expertise not available within the ﬁrm). Firms cannot extend an
individual contract for a cumulated period longer than 24 months.
1
EUI WP ECO 2004/23ﬁrms have started using temporary workers (temps henceforth) extensively,
especially in the manufacturing sector. The liberalization of THE immedi-
ately triggered a stormy policy debate over the risk of establishing a “dual
labor market”. In a dual labor market, regular jobs (with long-term con-
tracts, higher wages and union protection) coexist with precarious jobs (with
short-term contracts, lower wages and no access to beneﬁts tied to length of
service). This phenomenon can arise from diﬀerent dynamics: eﬃciency-
wage arguments, which lead ﬁrms to grant security to primary employees
and use secondary workers to deal with ﬂuctuations in demand (Saint-Paul,
1996); diverging paths of regulation for standard and non-standard contracts;
ﬂux and uncertainty, which adhere in the economic system and unevenly in-
ﬂuence factors of production or diﬀerent groups of workers (Piore, 1980).
If the liberalization of THE reinforced a similar phenomenon in Italy, one
should observe that temps are primarily used in more volatile sectors and
they are more precarious (i.e. receive shorter assignments and experience a
lower probability to ﬁnd a permanent job) exactly in those sectors.
In a related paper (Nannicini, 2004), I estimate the average utilization
of THE by economic sector and ﬁnd that the utilization rate is positively
correlated with production volatility. It may still be the case, however, that
in more volatile sectors temporary workers receive longer assignments or end
up attaining a stable job with greater probability. This is the reason why
the following analysis tries to disentangle the eﬀect of production volatility
on the duration of temporary contracts. Contract duration, indeed, seems a
good proxy of the precariousness of temps. According to the ﬁnding by Mon-
tanino and Sestito (2003) -about THE in Italy- contract length is positively
correlated with the probability to get a stable job.4 A three-month increase
of contract duration (equal to the standard deviation in their sample) en-
hances the probability to get a permanent job by 8 percentage points (the
average probability being equal to 34%). This positive association may be
due to the screening function of THE, or to the fact that workers with longer
assignments have a greater probability to be employed in the ﬁrm when a
permanent vacancy arises. Moreover, for temps who do not achieve a per-
manent position and go through repeated assignments, the average length of
4More precisely, Montanino and Sestito (2003) ﬁnd a reverse U-shaped relationship:
contract duration ﬁrstly enhances and then decreases the probability to ﬁnd a stable job.
However, the peak of this relationship is equal to 274 days (against an average duration of
73 days). In the sample used here, only 5% of total observations show a longer duration.
Hence, the eﬀect of contract length can be considered as positive.
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coeﬃcient of correlation equal to 0.7 in the sample used here).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the conﬂicting
ﬁndings of the theoretical literature on labor contract length are brieﬂyr e -
viewed. Section 3 presents a rudimentary theoretical model, which captures
the relevant trade-oﬀ in the ﬁrm’s choice of THE contract length. Section
4 tests the main predictions of the model. The econometric analysis makes
use of the Italian data set of “Manpower”, one of the main agencies in the
recently born Italian market. Section 5 draws some conclusions.
2 Theoretical Literature on Contract Length
There is a rich theoretical literature on the determinants of desired contract
durations, leading to conﬂicting predictions about the impact of uncertainty
and volatility on contract length. The early contributions emphasize that
volatility is negatively related to contract length, whereas contracting costs
positively aﬀect duration. Gray (1978) concludes that “increased variability
-regardless of source- shortens contract length”. Similarly, the eﬀect of in-
creased contracting costs on contract length is positive. These implications
arise from two basic ingredients: a transaction-cost argument and an eﬃcient-
production argument. The former emphasizes that longer contracts lower the
losses due to transaction costs. The latter stresses that shorter contracts re-
duce the expected losses due to ineﬃcient production and employment. This
is true because these expected losses increase with the deviation of the actual
real wage from the real wage that would equate the demand and supply of
labor, and such a deviation is greater for more distant periods as uncertainty
rises over time. Dye (1985) builds a model which tries to overcome some of
the limitations of Gray’s approach, ﬁnding the same theoretical implications
about uncertainty and contracting costs.
More recent models, however, stress that volatility may have a positive
eﬀect on contract length under some circumstances. Harris and Holmstrom
(1987) ﬁnd such a result using an information-cost argument. They develop a
model where recontracting occurs when the parties ﬁnd it proﬁtable to update
their information and pay the associated cost. In this setting, contract length
is the period between costly observations of the underlying state process.
Contracts may increase their duration with a greater uncertainty since, with
a noisier process, costly information is less valuable. More precisely, Harris
3
EUI WP ECO 2004/23and Holmstrom’s analysis leads to a U-shaped eﬀect of the variability of the
state process on contract duration: when the process is less volatile, con-
tract length decreases with noisiness; on the contrary, when the process is
more volatile, contract length increases with noisiness. Danziger (1988) uses
an eﬃcient-risk-sharing argument while showing a positive association be-
tween uncertainty and contract duration. A long-term labor relationship can
provide insurance against aggregate negative shocks for risk-averse workers.
The larger the aggregate variability, the greater the value attached to the
insurance protection delivered by longer contracts.
Empirical studies on the relationship between volatility and labor con-
tract length ﬁnd mixed results (Vroman, 1989; Wallace and Blanco, 1991;
Murphy, 1992), failing to establish any consistent evidence about the role
of uncertainty in shaping contract durations. The econometric analysis per-
formed in Section 4, which tries to disentangle the eﬀect of volatility on THE
contract length, can be seen as a peculiar test discriminating between the
conﬂicting predictions of the literature reviewed above. It should be noted,
however, that the assumptions of all these theoretical models ﬁtw e l lw i t h
the bargaining process of standard employment (where contracts are signed
in a regular and unionized setting), while THE assignments respond to dif-
ferent motivations and incentives. In the next section, a very simple model
of the choice of THE contract length is developed. As illustrated below, this
model leads to the same conclusion as Harris and Holmstrom’s or Danziger’s
(i.e. a positive association between volatility and duration), because of an
option-value argument: if the hiring of a new temp is related to an initial
cost due to selection or training, longer contracts have an option value in the
face of greater variability.
3 A Simple Model
The following model is an attempt to depict the choice of THE contract
length made by a ﬁrm which wants to hire a temporary worker in order to
face a non-permanent increase in market demand. This does not mean that
ﬂexibility is the only rationale for hiring contingent employees. However,
a c c o r d i n gt os u r v e y sa m o n gﬁrms, this is the most important motivation.
When asked why they make use of temporary workers, ﬁrms usually give two
types of answer: (1) organizational or business-cycle ﬂexibility; (2) screening
4
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often cited reason and deserves particular attention when addressing the
issue of contract length, which is a decision strictly linked to the original
motivation of the contract. Incidentally, it should be noticed that ﬂexibility
and screening are not necessarily substitute motivations, since in many cases
they may complement each other. For example, a ﬁrm might hire a temp
to face a positive shock and decide later to use the same worker (already
screened during the short-term assignment) to ﬁll a permanent vacancy.
The model below describes the choice of a ﬁrm which makes use of temps
in order to adjust its labor force to ﬂuctuations in demand. In this secondary
sector of the labor market, the ﬁrm is assumed to have all bargaining power,
i.e. it can determine both contract duration and wage. The trade-oﬀ arising
in the ﬁrm’s choice of contract length consists of the following. On one hand,
an increase of contract duration produces an expected gain: it allows the
ﬁrm to sidestep the investment in speciﬁc training, needed to insert a new
temp in the production process, if the positive shock is still there in the
immediate future and the old worker is no longer available (option value of
contract length). On the other hand, an increase of contract duration is
clearly associated with an expected loss: it forces the ﬁrm to pay the temp
even when she/he is no longer useful, if the positive shock disappears. What
follows is a simple formalization of such a trade-oﬀ.
Assume that the market demand a ﬁrm is facing evolves according to
the stochastic process Dt in discrete time. Demand can take three values:
high (DH); normal (DN); low (DL). For the ﬁrm, it makes sense to hire
temporary workers6 only when demand is high. The temp’s productivity is
equal to θ in such a case and zero otherwise. The ﬁrm’s decision problem
5Bronstein (1991), reviewing employer surveys for Western Europe, indicates three
main motivations: performance of occasional jobs or peak activity; temporary replace-
ments; prospecting among temporary workers for candidates to ﬁll vacancies on a per-
manent basis. According to a survey conducted by Abraham (1988) in the US, among
ﬁrms using temporary help employees 79% declared at least one motivation that might be
put under the broad heading of variability in demand. Atkinson et al. (1996) report a
survey for the UK, where ﬁrms indicated the following reasons to hire temporary workers
(multiple answers allowed): matching peaks in demand (63.3%); covering holidays/sick
leave (59.4%); performing one-oﬀ tasks (39%); trial for permanent work (20.2%); other.
A recent survey for Italy (Conﬁnterim, 2000) reports three reasons: peak activity (70%);
replacements (18%); expertise not available within the ﬁrm (12%).
6The number of temporary workers needed by the ﬁrm during a positive non-permanent
shock is exogenous and normalized to 1.
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such a period (call it time 0,w i t hD0 = DH), the ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
hire a temporary worker, who can be easily laid oﬀ when demand returns
to, or below, the normal level, unlike the primary labor force associated with
inﬁnite ﬁring costs. The ﬁrm must choose whether to use the worker only at
time 0 or to oﬀer her/him a contract of length τ. Labor law sets the maximum
allowed contract length at T.T h eﬁrm is risk-neutral and discounts future
payoﬀsa tt h er a t eβ. There are a lot of initially identical risk-neutral temps,
with reservation wage equal to w. The choice of the wage is determined by
the worker’s participation constraint. Assuming that workers can break the
contract in every period, the wage schedule is given by: wt = w.
Hiring a temp for the ﬁrst time, the ﬁrm must bear a sunk cost s in speciﬁc
training or transaction costs. The sunk cost s includes both the initial train-
ing cost necessary to teach to the worker how to accomplish her/his new tasks
and the reduction of worker’s productivity during the initial ﬁtting-in period
(i.e. the period needed to insert a new temp in the working environment).
The sunk cost s might also incorporate a transaction cost component linked
to the selection process. In every period, there is a probability λ that the
ﬁr mw i l ln o tb ea b l et oﬁnd the same worker used in a previous assignment.
To make the problem relevant, it is assumed that: θ − w − λs ≥ 0.
The choice of contract length depends both on the stochastic process Dt
a n dt h et i m eh o r i z o no ft h eﬁrm. Since contract length is usually constrained
by labor law to be short, the span of the time periods that the problem can
be decomposed in is small too. Market demand realizations are likely to be
independent across periods or positively correlated between each other. In
the following, two stochastic processes are considered.
1. Dt as a simple i.i.d. process. I ne v e r yp e r i o d ,d e m a n di sh i g h( DH)
with probability α;n o r m a l( DN) with probability (1−2α);o rl o w( DL)
with probability α. The parameter α captures the volatility of market
demand, i.e. the probability of experiencing a symmetric shock with
respect to the normal level of activity.
2. Dt as a discrete-time homogeneous Markov chain.I fd e m a n di si ns t a t e
DN, the next period there is the same probability α of observing a
positive or a negative shock. If demand is in state DH, in the next
period it will either stay there with probability 2α or go back to DN
with probability (1−2α). Similarly, if demand is in state DL,e i t h e ri t
6
EUI WP ECO 2004/23will stay there with probability 2α or go to DN with probability (1 −
2α). The parameter α captures the non-regularity of market demand,
incorporating both volatility and the persistence of shocks.
As a matter of notation, the conditional probabilities of experiencing
high, normal or low demand are deﬁned as: ht =P r [ Dk+t = DH | Dk = DH],
nt =P r [ Dk+t = DN | Dk = DH], lt =P r [ Dk+t = DL | Dk = DH]. In the i.i.d.
process, they are time-independent and equal to the state probabilities. In
t h eM a r k o vp r o c e s s ,t h e ya r eg i v e nb y :ht = αt+α, nt =1−2α, lt = α−αt.
As pointed out by Dye (1985), “the best current contract depends on the
contract concluded subsequent to the termination of the present one”. In
the present setting, this element could be introduced in two diﬀerent ways.
From one point of view, we could think about the time horizon of the ﬁrm’s
problem as being equal to T.I f t h e ﬁrm decided to employ the worker for
ap e r i o ds h o r t e rt h a nT and a new positive shock happened between the
termination period and T,i tw o u l dh a v et oﬁnd a new employee using the
“spot” market for temporary help employment. From another point of view,
however, we might want to allow the ﬁrm to re-maximize when a new positive
shock shows up, after the termination of the previous contract. This option
c o u l db ee m b e d d e di na ni n ﬁnite-horizon problem. In the following, the
problem will be analyzed both in ﬁnite and inﬁnite horizon.
3.1 Finite Horizon
In the ﬁnite-horizon perspective, the ﬁrm chooses the length of the contract
knowing that if it needs a temp after the termination period, it will have to
use the THE spot market (i.e. the market for one-period temps). In such a
case, the ﬁrm will have to again pay the sunk cost in selection or training, if
it does not ﬁnd the ﬁrst-contract worker in the spot market. The discount
rate β can be safely set to 1 in this case. Thus the ﬁrm’s choice of the optimal
τ coincides with the following problem:
V =m a x
τ∈[1,T]






ht(θ − w − λs)} (FH)
The longer contract condition (LCC) of the problem (the condition that
makes it proﬁtable for the ﬁrm to extend the contract from t to t +1 )i s :
htλs ≥ (1 − ht)w (LCC)
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period increase of contract length (speciﬁcally, the expected saving in speciﬁc
training or transaction costs). This expected saving comes from the option
value of duration. The right-hand side represents the loss associated to a
one-period increase of contract length (i.e. the expected wage loss if worker’s
productivity falls to zero). The necessary conditions for an interior τ to be
optimal are that the LCC holds at τ − 1 and it does not hold at τ7.
With the i.i.d. process, since ht does not depend on time (ht = α),
the parameters of the model fully determine the relevant comparison. Only
boundary solutions are possible. If we interpret as a positive eﬀect on du-
ration any shift from τ =1to τ = T,w ec a ns e et h a tt h eo p t i m a ll e v e l
of contract length is increasing in s, λ and α, and decreasing in w.T h e s e
results are very intuitive: an increase of s (or λ) raises the marginal beneﬁt
of extending τ by one period; an increase of w raises the marginal cost; an
increase of α both raises the marginal beneﬁt and lowers the marginal cost.
With the Markov process, ht is a decreasing function of time (ht = αt+α).
The necessary conditions identify one or, at most, two candidate solutions,
but now interior solutions are possible. The LCC is a decreasing and convex
function of time. Looking at shifts in the LCC, we can easily see that the
same comparative statics’ implications hold. The optimal contract length is
increasing in s, λ and α (i.e. their increase shifts the LCC upward), and
decreasing in w (i.e. the opposite holds). The persistence of the positive
shock reinforces the eﬀect of demand volatility.
3.2 Inﬁnite Horizon
In the inﬁnite-horizon perspective, the optimization problem starts any time
a positive shock occurs and the previous contract has already expired. Deﬁn-
ing pxy =P r [ Dt+1 = DY | Dt = DX],w ec a ns u m m a r i z et h ei n ﬁnite horizon
problem by means of the value functions in the states of high, normal and
low demand, when the previous contract is no longer binding:
VH = V
VN = β(pnhVH + pnnVN + pnlVL)=πNV
VL = β(plhVH + plnVN + pllVL)=πLV
7For the boundary solutions, only one necessary condition is needed: that LCC does
not hold at 1 for τ =1 ;t h a tL C C T−1 holds at T − 1 for τ = T.
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the states of normal and low demand, where temps are not productive. In a
sense, VH is an absorbing state, since the optimal choice of τ is made only
when a positive shock occurs and the previous contract has already expired.
Consequently, the inﬁnite-horizon problem can be re-formulated as:










τ(hτ + nτπN + lτπL)
The choice of τ inﬂuences both the utility during the contract period -P(τ)-
and the timing/discounting of the start of a new optimization decision -π(τ).
Since the stochastic processes we are interested in are stationary, the problem
assumes a ﬁxed-point nature. Of course, the discount factor β matters in this
setting. If β =1 , speciﬁc training or transaction costs are no longer an issue,
since the ﬁrm must undertake it for an inﬁnite number of times and the
problem is not well deﬁned (πN = πL =1 ). If ﬁrms discount future payoﬀs
(β<1), the timing of the sunk-cost payment aﬀects the decision problem.
The longer contract condition (LCC) of the inﬁnite-horizon problem can
be expressed as:
P(τ +1 )





By means of numerical simulations, it is possible to show that the same com-
parative statics results of the ﬁnite-horizon problem hold in this setting. In
Appendix I -for the sake of concision- only the two main implications about
volatility and ﬁxed costs are graphically shown. For a ﬁrst baseline conﬁgu-
ration of the parameters,8 a smoothed increase of α enhances τ. Analogously,
for a second baseline conﬁguration of the parameters, a smoothed increase
of s is associated with a step-by-step increase in τ.
8Many other conﬁgurations of the basic parameters have been used to perform similar
simulations: they all lead to the same qualitative implications.
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4.1 Data
The previous model uses an option-value argument to ﬁnd a positive eﬀect
of volatility (interpreted as the deviation of activity from its normal level) on
contract duration. Longer contracts have an option value, since they can be
used to sidestep (or to postpone) the sunk cost due to the selection or training
of temps. In this respect, the proposed framework displays the same results
of the most recent models reviewed in section 2, like Harris and Holmstrom’s
or Danziger’s. A crucial feature of this argument is that the ﬁrm may not be
able to re-hire a worker previously used in a short-term assignment (λ 6=0 ).
Since the probability of not ﬁnding the ﬁrst-contract worker is greater in a
tighter labor market, using a measure of local unemployment we can test the
eﬀect of λ together with the volatility eﬀect (i.e. the eﬀect of α). Both eﬀects
will be examined in this section.















The econometric analysis makes use of the national data set of “Man-
power”, an international ﬁrm operating in the sector of THE and one of the
main companies in the recently born Italian market. The market share of
“Manpower” in Italy is around 25% and its agencies are distributed across
all regions. The data set contains the individual characteristics of all temps
10
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worker are reported: gender; age; place of residence; marital status; national-
ity; occupation proﬁle (blue-collar or white-collar). The data set contains the
number and time-length of temporary assignments, as well as the economic
sector and geographical location of the client ﬁrms that used the worker.
The data set considers all the workers sent to temporary assignments.
The starting dates of recorded assignments range from February 1998 to
December 2001; the number of temporary workers is 111,161;t h en u m b e ro f
using ﬁrms is 23,027; the total number of signed contracts is 197,953. Table 1
reports some descriptive statistics of the individual characteristics of tempo-
rary workers employed by “Manpower”. All variables but age and “waiting
period” (i.e. the waiting period from the enrollment in the agency list to
the ﬁrst assignment) are dummies. The representative temp is young (the
average age is 28.7), single (79 percent); male (62 percent) and blue-collar
(72 percent). The vast majority of workers is Italian, although 11 percent
of them have diﬀerent nationality. Nearly one third of workers (34 percent)
received more than one temporary assignment, and 14p e r c e n tm o r et h a n
two. If we classify workers according to the broad sector of the economy
or the geographical location where they were employed, we see that THE is
prevalently used by ﬁr m si nt h eN o r t ho ft h ec o u n t r y( 5 7p e r c e n t )a n di nt h e
manufacturing sector (73 percent). The ﬁgures for ﬁrms instead of workers
(not reported in Table 1) are slightly diﬀerent: 71 percent in the manufactur-
ing sector and 69 percent from the North. This means that manufacturing
ﬁrms are not only the lion’s share of those using temps, but they also use
this new form of employment more frequently than other ﬁrms. Firms from
the South use THE intensively (15 percent of total workers), even though
they are a smaller fraction of the total using ﬁrms (4 percent).
Some additional stylized facts should be taken into account. According
to an employer survey (Conﬁnterim, 2000), 70% of using ﬁrms report “peak
activity” as the main rationale for hiring temps in Italy. As noted above, the
estimated utilization intensity of temporary employees by economic sector is
positively correlated with production volatility (Nannicini, 2004). Moreover,
the bargaining power of temporary workers appears to be considerably lower
than that of regular and unionized workers. On the whole, the basic assump-
tions of the model developed in Section 3 seem to reasonably describe the
case of THE in Italy.
11
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In order to test the volatility eﬀect, we must choose how to measure variabil-
ity in economic activity. Considering the available data, the variance of the
sectorial index of industrial production (VOL) can be used in this respect.
This measure can be retrieved for 9 manufacturing sectors from oﬃcial sta-
tistics by “Istat” (“Conti trimestrali”). The fact that only manufacturing
sectors are considered is not a great limitation, since -as shown in table 1-
the vast majority of Italian temps are employed in manufacturing. The val-
ues of VOL for the period of the “Manpower” data set average 455 in the
available sectors,9 with a standard deviation equal to 116. It is also inter-
esting to look at the eﬀect of positive variability only, using the part of the
variance for the periods when the index of industrial production is above its
trend level (POS). The values of POS average 201 in the available sectors,
with a standard deviation equal to 35. Moreover, in order to exploit not
only the between-industry variation but also the within-industry variation,
we could use the variance of the sectorial index of industrial production in
the 12 months before the signing of each contract (VOL12).10 As soon as
data with a longer time spell become available, it will be interesting to look
at the eﬀect of some measure of the persistence of positive shocks.
In order to test the labor-market eﬀect (i.e. the eﬀect of the probability
of not ﬁnding a worker previously used in a short-term assignment), we must
obtain a measure of the tightness of the labor market by geographical loca-
tion. The unemployment rate by province (U) can be used in this respect.11
This local unemployment rate can be retrieved for the 103 Italian provinces
from “Istat” statistics (see “Indagine sulla forza lavoro”). For the period of
the “Manpower” data set, the values of U (in percentage terms) average 7.7,
with a standard deviation equal to 5.5.
9The sectors are: “food&etc.”; “textiles&etc.”; “wood&etc.”; “chemicals”; “non-metal
minerals”; “metals”; “energy”; “machinery&electronics”; “transportation manufacturing”.
10As an alternative to this measure, we could use the variance of the index of indus-
trial production in the 12m o n t h safter the signing of each contract (incorporating a
rational-expectation assumption). But we would lose 12 months of observations lowering
the explicative power of the within-industry variation.
11Notice that the econometric results presented in this section are not altered by the
utilization of the young unemployment rate (considering that temps are mostly young
workers) instead of the overall unemployment rate. The same holds if one uses a proxy
of λ derived directly from the “Manpower” data set, such as the province-speciﬁca v e r a g e
waiting time in the agency list.
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In the restricted 9-sector data set (containing information on 116,979 indi-
vidual contracts), the average duration is equal to 57.7 days (with a standard
deviation equal to 79), while the median duration is 30 days. The distribu-
tion of observed contract length is positively skewed. A semilog speciﬁcation
seems appropriate. Hence, the dependent variable used in the following is
the log of contract duration (DUR).
Concerning the econometric speciﬁcation, duration techniques are not
appropriate, as one could think at ﬁrst. The dependent variable is the dura-
tion agreed upon at the signing of the contract, depending on the worker’s
and ﬁrm’s characteristics at that point. Premature separations are not ob-
served. Using standard regression techniques, however, we must be aware
of the problem caused by the merging of micro and aggregate data (Kloek,
1981; Moulton, 1990). The speciﬁcation must incorporate the fact that dis-
turbances are correlated within groups. It is reasonable to expect that units
within the same industry share some unobservable characteristics that lead
the regression disturbances to be correlated. Failure to incorporate group
eﬀects may produce a large downward bias in the standard errors, especially
if the eﬀect of interest has to be estimated using between-group variation.
Two settings can be considered: (1) longitudinal data set with the date of
the contract as the time dimension, where VOL12 is the volatility measure;
(2) pooled cross-section with only the ﬁrst contract of each individual, where
VOL and POS are two alternative volatility measures. In the ﬁrst setting,
it is possible to control for industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects and to exploit the
within variability while estimating the volatility eﬀect. In the second setting,
it is possible to exploit the between variability while estimating the volatility
eﬀect, but it is necessary to control for within-industry disturbance corre-
lation. There are two general ways to deal with such a bias in the pooled
cross-section setting: (a) to ﬁx up the naive OLS standard errors; (b) to
estimate a random-eﬀect speciﬁcation. In the following, all these solutions
are implemented to control for potential within-industry correlation.
Table 2 reports the results of the regression of the log of contract length
(DUR) on volatility (VOL12 or VOL), unemployment (U) and the available
controls. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation refers to the longitudinal setting and controls
both for industry-speciﬁc ﬁxed-eﬀect and individual random-eﬀect (adjusting
the standard errors for clustering). The other speciﬁcations refer to the
pooled cross-section setting. The second one is standard OLS. The third
one is OLS with ﬁxed-up standard errors, to incorporate the within-industry
13
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one is a maximum-likelihood (ML) random-eﬀect regression.
According to the ﬁxed-eﬀect speciﬁcation, an increase of the within volatil-
ity equal to its standard deviation produces on average an 8% increase of con-
tract length. According to pooled OLS, an increase of the between volatility
equal to its standard deviation produces on average a 15% increase of con-
tract length. The ML random-eﬀect slightly increases the volatility eﬀect to
17%. However, while in the ﬁxed-eﬀect speciﬁcation volatility is signiﬁcant
at the level of 1%, in the OLS with Moulton-adjusted standard errors and in
the ML random-eﬀect speciﬁcation volatility is signiﬁcant only at the 10%
level. The labor market eﬀect shows the expected sign and is signiﬁcant at
the 1% level in all the considered speciﬁcations. An increase of the unem-
ployment rate equal to its standard deviation has a negative eﬀect from 13%
to 15% on contract length.
Table 3 reports the results of the regression of the log of contract length
(DUR) on positive volatility (POS12 or POS), unemployment (U) and the
available controls. In the pooled cross-section setting, OLS with and without
Moulton-adjusted standard errors and the ML random-eﬀect speciﬁcation are
reported. According to OLS, an increase of the positive variance equal to its
standard deviation produces on average a 21% increase of contract length. An
increase of the unemployment rate equal to its standard deviation produces a
14% drop. In the ML random-eﬀect, both the volatility and the labor market
eﬀects have a slightly greater magnitude (24% and 15% respectively). Most
importantly, both the labor market eﬀect and the positive volatility eﬀect
are always signiﬁcant at the level of 1%i na l lt h ec o n s i d e r e ds p e c i ﬁcations.
Notice that the econometric results presented in Table 2 and Table 3 are not
altered by the introduction of a full set of interactions.






+( n − 1)]ρXρ
where b β i st h eO L Ss l o p ec o e ﬃcient estimator of the regressor X;
V (b β)
V0(b β) the ratio of the true
variance of the estimator to its misspeciﬁed variance; ns the size of group s; n the average
group size; ρX the intraclass correlation of the regressor X; ρ the intraclass correlation of
disturbances (under the assumption that errors are equicorrelated within groups).
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EUI WP ECO 2004/23Table 2. The eﬀects of volatility and unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DUR DUR DUR DUR
VOL12 .0231 -- -
(.0075) - - -
VOL - .0013. 0 0 13. 0 0 15
-( . 0 0 0 1) (.0007) (0.0008)
U -.0281 -.0251 -.0251 -.0280
(.0021)( . 0 0 12) (.0115) (.0011)
Male .0059 .0366 .0366 .0055
(.0165) (.0102) (.0882) (.0106)
Age .0076 .0083 .0083 .0076
(.0011) (.0007) (.0022) (.0007)
Single -.1610- . 1759 -.1759 -.1612
(.0193) (.0132) (.0197) (.0122)
Italy -.1405 -.1566 -.1566 -.1404
(.0164) (.0117) (.0484) (.0141)
Blue -.4117- . 3 166 -.3166 -.4111
(.0231)( . 0 162) (.1066) (.0135)
North -.2142 -.1761 -.1761 -.2142
(.0129) (.0097) (.0419) (.0106)
South -.5112- . 4 4 8 0- . 4 4 8 0 - . 5 109
(.0365) (.0151) (.2562) (.0152)
(1)F i x e d - e ﬀect; (2) POLS; (3) POLS Moulton s.e.; (4) random-eﬀect.
To sum up, the empirical evidence presented here is consistent with the
two main implications derived from the simple theoretical model presented
in Section 3. Contract length is longer in more volatile sectors, since the
duration of THE assignments may have an option value. Contract length is
lower where unemployment is greater, since it is also greater the probability
of ﬁnding again a worker previously used in a short-term assignment. The
ﬁrst empirical ﬁnding is also coherent with the implications of the most
recent models on contract length reviewed in Section 2, such as Harris and
Holmstrom’s (1987) and Danziger’s (1988).
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EUI WP ECO 2004/23Table 3. The eﬀects of positive volatility and unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DUR DUR DUR DUR
POS12. 0 115- - -
(.0010) - - -
POS - .0060 .0060 .0069
-( . 0 0 0 1) (0.0020) (.0021)
U -.0283 -.0266 -.0266 -.0280
(.0021)( . 0 0 11)( . 0 108) (.0011)
Male .0074 .0181 .0181 .0056
(.0165) (.0101) (.0907) (.0106)
Age .0076 .0082 .0082 .0076
(.0011) (.0006) (.0021) (.0007)
Single -.1588 -.1672 -.1672 -.1612
(.0193) (.0117) (0.0127) (.0122)
Italy -.1368 -.1365 -.1365 -.1404
(.0164) (.0132) (.0381)( . 0 141)
Blue -.4132 -.3534 -.3534 -.4111
(.0181)( . 0 132) (.1132) (.0135)
North -.2155 -.1767 -.1767 -.2140
(.0128) (.0096) (.0369) (.0106)
South -.5166 -.4768 -.4768 -.5109
(.0346) (.0151) (0.2468) (.0152)
(1)F i x e d - e ﬀe c t ;( 2 ) P O L S ;( 3 )P O L SM o u l t o ns . e . ;( 4 )r a n d o m - e ﬀect.
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, I have investigated the eﬀect of production volatility on the
duration of THE contracts. In order to highlight the relevant trade-oﬀ in
the ﬁrm’s choice of assignment durations, I have developed a very simple
theoretical model in Section 3. The model has two testable implications.
First, volatility positively inﬂuences contract length, because of an option-
value argument: assuming that the hiring of a new temp is associated with
selection and training costs, longer contracts have an option value in the
face of greater uncertainty. Second, the shortage of alternative employment
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EUI WP ECO 2004/23opportunities negatively inﬂuences contract length, since the option value of
duration is reduced by the greater probability of ﬁnding a temp previously se-
lected and trained. Using data on the temporary workers hired by one of the
leading agencies in Italy, both implications are conﬁrmed by the economet-
ric analysis in Section 4, even after carefully controlling for within-industry
disturbance correlation. The industry-speciﬁc variance of production is posi-
tively correlated with contract length. On the contrary, the province-speciﬁc
unemployment rate is negatively correlated with contract length.
On the whole, in the Italian THE market, more volatile sectors both use
THE more intensively (Nannicini, 2004) and oﬀer longer contracts. Since
contract duration turns out to be a good proxy of the precariousness of
temps (as discussed in Section 1), these workers are better oﬀ in more volatile
sectors. A similar result might seem surprising at a ﬁr s tg l a n c e .B u ti ti sn o t ,
if one agrees with the option-value argument developed in this paper. Sectors
that mostly need employment ﬂexibility are using THE more intensively, but
it is precisely in these sectors that temporary workers -in a sense- are not so
“temporary”. Employers who know that they will need temps frequently in
the near future are concerned about minimizing selection and training costs,
and they are more willing to invest in temps to keep them linked to their
working environment.
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